













































encouraged.	A	 free	flow	of	 conflicting	opinions	 is,	according	 to	Mill,	 less	
dangerous	than	useful,	and	 it	 is	 therefore	desirable.	 In	this	respect,	On	
Liberty	is	a	book	very	well	suited	to	our	own	current	pluralistic	societies,	
where	we	are	used	to	hearing	and	reading	about	extremely	diverse	points	





























































portion	of	a	person’s	 life	and	 conduct	which	affects	 only	himself,	 or	 if	















































































reasoning	 it	 is	not	because	of	 the	evidence	he	produces,	but	because	he	
touches	the	right	chords	appealing	quietly	to	our	intuitions	and	received	
ideas	about	what	is	right	and	wrong.	


























































sidered.	What	Mill	actually	meant	was	 that	 it	 is	not	useful	 to	 impose	a	
false	belief	(and	so	utility	requires	authorities	and	social	majorities	not	to	
be	dogmatic,	but	to	allow	criticism	instead).	Besides,	Mill	himself	suggests	




































only	 hold	 them	 because	 they	 do	 not	 suffer	 themselves	 to	 think.”	 (OL:	
39).
1.3. The foundations of truth
We	should	expose	our	opinions	and	beliefs	to	criticism	in	case	they	are	
wrong,	but	what	if	they	are	right?	Mill	finds	some	reasons	for	tolerating	







in	another,	 it	 is	 surely	 in	 learning	 the	grounds	 of	 one’s	 own	opinion.”	
(OL:	41).
To	be	 sure,	 rooting	firmly	 the	 truths	we	hold	 is	presumably	a	good	






























1.4. The vitality of truth
A	further	reason	for	subjecting	even	true	beliefs	and	doctrines	to	open	
criticism	is,	according	to	Mill,	that	truth	only	thrives	when	exposed.	










forgotten	 in	 the	absence	of	discussion,	but	 too	often	 the	meaning	of	 the	
opinion	itself.”	(OL:	45).	Of	course,	the	reasons	why	nurturing	the	vitality	























































































1.6. The utilitarian balance and the harm principle
We	have	seen	how	Mill	rests	his	defence	of	freedom	of	speech	on	utili-










































































































We	can	safely	say	 that	Mill’s	harm	principle	allows	 for	 legal	 restriction	
and	prosecution	of	hate	speech	which	is	directly	conducive	to	violence	or	
discrimination	 against	 individuals	 or	 groups,	 as	 in	 the	 corn	 dealer	 ex-
ample.	However,	 there	may	be	cases	of	hate	speech	where	 incitement	 is	
only	indirect	or	entirely	dependent	on	the	listeners’	disposition.	In	those	
cases	 it	 is	 offence,	 rather	 than	 harm,	 which	 is	 prevented	 by	 restricting	
the	speech,	and	therefore	Mill’s	arguments	could	work	against	censorship.	
At	 first	 glance,	“Mill’s	 argument	 against	 censorship	 may	 seem	 to	 imply	







fore	 it	 cannot	benefit	 from	 the	main	 rationale	 of	 granting	 liberty	 of	 ex-
pression.	However,	Alexander	(2001:	59)	points	out	that	if	the	government	
suppresses	some	speech	on	the	ground	that	the	speech	is	misleading	and	

























an	 example,	 it	 is	 not	 clear	 that	“dissemination	 of	 ideas	 based	 on	 racial	
superiority	or	hatred”,	which	must	be	legally	punished	by	participants	in	
the	 International	Convention	 on	 the	Elimination	 of	All	Forms	 of	Racial	












If	Scanlon	 is	right	 in	relating	this	 theory	of	 liberty	of	expression	to	
Mill,	we	will	have	to	admit	that	hate-speech	restrictions	are	not	always	
consistent	 with	 Millian	 principles,	 because	 those	 restrictions	 extend	 to	
speech	that	simply	leads	people	to	have	dangerous	or	wicked	beliefs.6	Even	
5	 In	fact,	the	U.S.A.,	France,	Italy	and	other	countries	signed	the	Convention	with	res-
ervations	 regarding	 article	 4,	 because	 its	 eventual	 conflict	 with	 the	 right	 of	 free	 ex-



















nity,	which	 create	an	 sphere	 of	 individual	 immunity	but	also	a	 liability	














happiness.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 application	 of	 the	 principle	 of	 utility	 re-























Related	 to	hate	speech,	but	 in	some	aspects	different,	 is	 the	speech	
that	 denies	 or	 diminishes	 historical	 events,	 like	 the	 Holocaust	 or	 other	
genocides,	and	is	deeply	offensive	to	some	people	and	despised	by	many.	





the	 crimes”	 of	 genocide	 typified	 in	 the	previous	paragraph.7	Many	 legal	
scholars	objected	that	this	formulation	was	too	broad	to	comply	with	the	
requirements	of	certainty	and	minimal	intervention	inherent	to	criminal	


















7	 “La	 difusión	 por	 cualquier	 medio	 de	 ideas	 o	 doctrinas	 que	 nieguen	 o	 justifiquen	 los	











The	 decision	 of	 Spanish	 Constitutional	 Court	 seems	 to	 conform	 to	
Mill’s	defence	of	the	liberty	of	expressing	any	harmless	opinions	or	beliefs,	
no	matter	how	false	or	unconventional	they	are;	although	Mill	certainly	















as	 a	 consequence,	 accuse	 the	 victims	 themselves	 of	 falsifying	 history.	
Denying	crimes	against	humanity	is	therefore	one	of	the	most	serious	
forms	of	racial	defamation	of	Jews	and	of	incitement	to	hatred	of	them.	
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